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Introduction 
The South-eastern Anatolia Project (GAP) is a significant regional development programme 
that exhibits the regional potential of Turkey and contributes to national economy in real terms 
with welfare it brings along. It is a project that sets local initiatives in motion and it has 
attainable targets. The GAP is the largest project ever in Turkey and also one of the largest 
throughout the world. As such, it is the indicator of determinedness to walk ahead in unity and 
openness to further development.1  
         GAP Administration, 2016  
 
This statement by the administration of the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its 
Turkish acronym Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), demonstrates the ambitious character 
of this water development project that was formally created in 1980. During Atatürk’s reign 
the idea that the waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris could be utilized to advance the 
development and modernization of Turkey caught on.2 Throughout the following decades the 
Turkish government and specialists worked on ambitious projects that aimed to increase 
available arable land and generate energy, hereby improving the autarkic ability of the 
Turkish state.3 These initiatives merged together in 1980 and formed the GAP. The goal of the 
GAP was to build 22 dams, contribute to 22% of Turkish hydroelectric power and irrigate 1.7 
million hectares of land.4 Although originally the water development projects had economic 
goals, the GAP over time became a much larger project that was aimed at sustainable human 
development in the Southeast region. According to the organization itself its ‘primary goal is 
the happiness of people’.5 The GAP was and is promoted as a method to improve health and 
education services, the position of women, transportation, infrastructure and employment in 
the Southeast region. Despite this seemingly social character of the GAP, the project was 
controversial from the start for several reasons and with several parties.  
  The first critical response to the Turkish plans came from across the borders. The 
transboundary flow of the Euphrates and the Tigris naturally connects Turkey to Syria and 
																																								 																				
1	Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, “Action Plan GAP,” 
http://www.gap.gov.tr/en/action-plan-page-5.html last accessed 13-06-2017.  
2 Leila M. Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies of the Southeastern Anatolia Project,” Society & Natural 
Resources 15-8 (2002): 743-759, 748. 
3 Jeroen Warner, “The struggle over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam: domestic and international security linkages,” 
International Environmental Agreements 12 (2012): 231-250, 235. 
4 Kenneth Cushner, Linda Robertson, Suheyla Kirca, Melek Cakmak, “A cross-cultural material development 
project to train Turkish development personnel in the Southeastern Anatolia Regional Development Project 
(GAP),” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 27 (2003): 609–626, 610.  
5 “What is GAP,” GAP administration, accessed December 28, 2016, http://www.gap.gov.tr/en/what-is-gap-
page-1.html. 		
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Iraq and so whenever one of the riparian states sets up an ambitious water developing project 
the other riparian states want to make sure their access to the water supply is safeguarded. 
Throughout the twentieth century the relations between the riparian states of the Euphrates 
and Tigris basin went through difficult times and the issue of water often intensified the 
strains.6 Although Syria and Iraq were not on great terms, they were able to unify in their 
protest against the GAP. Not only were the Syrian and Iraqi government concerned that the 
implementation of GAP projects would lead to lower water quantity and quality but they also 
feared that the GAP dams would give Turkey the power and instruments to control the water 
flow in the region.7 The second group that opposed the ideas of the GAP consisted of NGOs 
and local activists that took a stance based on environmentalist, ethnic, humanitarian or 
cultural arguments.8 Although the propagated aims of the GAP talk about human development 
and human happiness, activist groups quickly realized that the GAP would have serious 
consequences for the environment and the cultural heritage of the region and that the 
sustainable human development would exclude certain parts of the population. The third 
group that was involved in the GAP and that had to be critical of the proposed projects 
consisted of international funders.9 Due to the magnitude of the GAP Turkey was in need of 
funding. Traditional international funders, such as the World Bank and UNDP, supported 
some socio-economic activities of the GAP but refused to finance projects that did not include 
a tripartite agreement between Turkey, Syria and Iraq.10 As an alternative the GAP looked at 
European enterprises for funding and found some willing partners. However, after a while the 
controversy about human rights and environmental threats reached its pinnacle and as a 
response many European funders withdrew their support of the GAP.11  
  Despite the opposition to the GAP, Turkey has been steadily implementing its projects 
in the last decades. It has built dams, has flooded certain areas and has relocated parts of its 
population. So how can the continuous development of Turkey’s water projects be explained? 
How have the Turkish government and the GAP administration been able to circumvent all 
these oppositional groups? Researchers Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner have created a 
framework that can help explain the developments of water politics around the world and 
																																								 																				
6 Aysegül Kibaroglu and Tugba Evrim Maden, “An analysis of the causes of water crisis in the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin,” Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences 4 (2014): 347-353, 349. 
7 Warner, “The struggle over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam,” 236.  
8 Ibid, 235.  
9 Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies,” 746.  
10 Ibid.	
11 Warner, “The struggle over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam,” 243.  
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especially in the Middle East.12 With the use of the ‘hydro-hegemony’ concept they explain 
the asymmetric power relations in water politics and the effect of these power relations. 
Zeitoun and Warner argue that between the riparian states of a certain basin one state is able 
to dominate the others. The state that is most successful in combining its riparian position, 
power and exploitation potential has the highest hydropower potential of the basin.13 In the 
case of the Euphrates-Tigris basin Turkey has been able to act as the hydro-hegemon and has 
throughout the twentieth century dominated water politics over Syria and Iraq.14 Although the 
framework that is created by Zeitoun and Warner is useful, it presupposes that water politics 
take place in a stable or at least organized (inter)national setting and that the involved actors 
are state-actors. This might have been the case throughout the twentieth and at the start of the 
21st century but this assumption is now no longer matching to the reality of the region and the 
situation of the riparian states.  
  The developments over the last decade, first political turmoil and destruction of 
institutions in Iraq followed by a civil and proxy war in Syria, have disturbed the balance 
between the riparian states of the Euphrates-Tigris basin. Although the relation between the 
riparian states developed over time, with highs and lows characterizing their political relations 
and cooperative water initiatives, there were no drastic changes in the actors involved. The 
traditional parties such as national governments, technical specialists and international funders 
worked together or worked against each other to create or block water cooperative initiatives 
on a national or transnational scale.15 During the twentieth century water management and 
development became politicized and it changed from being a technological issue to a more 
political and diplomatic matter.16 This shift was significant but it did not alter the power 
balance that was prevalent amongst the riparian states. The political instability of the last 
couple of years does have the potential to drastically alter the regional order and the balance 
of power that has lasted throughout the past decades. Regimes have collapsed in Syria and 
Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) has risen as a regional power, the Kurdish political movement has 
reinforced its mission and the presence of foreign powers has increased. Taking these diverse 
developments in the region into account, it is not difficult to conclude that the organized 
structure of water politics between riparian states in the Euphrates-Tigris basin suffered some 
																																								 																				
12 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony- a Framework for Analysis of Trans-Boundary Water 
Conflicts,” Water Policy 8-5 (2006): 435-460, 435. 
13 Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony,” 460.	 
14 Ibid.   
15	Kibaroglu and Maden, “An analysis of the causes of water crisis,” 349-350.	
16	Ibid, 351. 
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damage.    
  Water in the Middle East is a topic that has been extensively covered in literature, 
whether viewed from a historic, environmental or political perspective. Turkey’s ambitious 
GAP is no exception to this tendency. However, the impact of recent events in the region on 
water politics has not been explored. This essay aims to complement existing understanding 
of Turkey’s water politics and its relations to involved actors by analyzing the role of non-
state actors in water politics and by incorporating recent events and power shifts. The question 
central in this essay is: To what extent have non-state actors challenged the Turkish hydro-
hegemony in the period 1980-2017? The term hydro-hegemony in this essay means that 
Turkey has been able to utilize most of the water resources from the Euphrates and Tigris and 
has been able to set the agenda and dominate riparian states Syria and Iraq in water 
cooperative talks and water politics from the 1960s till today.17 It also means that Turkey has 
been able to implement the GAP without having to alter its plans due to opposition from other 
states. Although the GAP does not cover the entire field of water development in Turkey, it is 
by far the largest project and has most impact on the other riparian states. For this reason the 
GAP and its various subprojects are central in this analysis. Although the definition that was 
coined by Zeitoun and Warner is used, this article does challenge the framework that these 
authors created alongside this definition of the hydro-hegemony. Their article has proven to 
be very useful in analyzing the power relations between riparian states but their conclusions 
will be challenged throughout this essay due to the fact that this analysis centers non-state 
actors instead of state actors and so offers an alternative perspective on water politics in the 
region.   
  The non-state actors that are central in this essay are (I)NGOs, Kurdish political 
movements and militant Kurdish groups, civil society and international funders. The focus on 
non-state actors does not mean that the actors are non-political. The Kurds, or the various 
Kurdish movements and parties in the riparian states are of great importance to this analysis 
and they have clear political goals. This essay will not speak of Kurdish separatists or 
separatist movements because the major Kurdish parties have developed their political aims 
over time and have abandoned the wish for an independent Kurdish nation state.18 Instead 
they have adopted the idea of democratic confederalism, a political solution that can be 
																																								 																				
17 Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony," 442.	
18 Till F. Paasche, “Syrian and Iraqi Kurds: Conflict and Cooperation,” Middle East Policy 22-1 (2015): 77-88, 
80.  
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implemented without challenging the existence of the Turkish, Syrian and Iraqi states.19 
Although this essay examines the roles of various non-state actors, it also aims to show that 
the non-state actors at times cooperate and unite in their opposition or support of water 
projects. An example of this is the cooperation between Turkish campaigns and European 
NGOs to stop the flooding of Hasankeyf as a consequence of the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris.20 
  The first chapter of this essay will give a historic overview of the development of the 
GAP, the consolidation of Turkey as the hydro-hegemon and its relations to other involved 
actors. This chapter is not only necessary to place the developments in a historic context but 
will also demonstrate the shift in power dynamics between state and non-state actors in 
Turkish water politics. It will cover the first wave of protest against the GAP and will include 
a case study on the Ilisu Dam on the Tigris, the most controversial part of the GAP that 
caused an increasing involvement of national and international non-state actors in Turkish 
water politics. This dam, that is almost complete, will result in the flooding of 200 towns and 
villages, including the ancient town of Hasankeyf.21 The combined historic, ethnic and 
cultural significance of the town has made the Ilisu Dam part of national and international 
debate that started in the 1990s but gained momentum in the first years of the 21st century.22 
Despite the fact that the Ilisu Dam controversy has been extensively covered in the literature, 
it is of vital importance for this essay to include it because it was the first time that national 
and international non-state actors, from various backgrounds and ideologies were able to 
cooperate and challenge the dominance of the Turkish government over water issues. The 
Ilisu Dam affair also marked the beginning of open, environmental and cultural protest from 
local activists. The environmental education and awareness in Turkey was somewhat lacking 
at the turn of the century but the initiatives that were set up in protest against the Ilisu Dam 
helped spread awareness about the consequences of these hydraulic projects.23 Although the 
Ilisu Dam was the topic of debate during the first decade of the 21st century, it is still at the 
core of many protest movements and activist resistance against the GAP today.   
  The second chapter is focused on the current hydro-hegemony challengers, the non-
state actors that lead the protest against the GAP in Turkey. The period between 2012-2017 
																																								 																				
19 Ibid, 81.  
20 C. Eberlein, H. Drillisch, E. Ayboga and T. Wenidoppler, “The Ilisu Dam in Turkey and the Role of Export 
Credit Agencies and NGO Networks,” Water Alternatives 3-2 (2010): 291-312, 299.	
21 Lena Hommes, Rutgerd Boelens and Harro Maat, “Contested hydrosocial territories and disputed water 
governance: Struggles and competing claims over the Ilisu Dam development in southeastern Turkey,” 
Geoforum 71 (2016): 9-20, 9.		
22	Eberlein, et.al., “The Ilisu Dam in Turkey,” 304.		
23 Berin Golonu, “Activism Rooted in Tradition,” Third Text 27-1 (2013): 54-64, 55-56.  
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will be discussed. Due to several reasons, which will be explained in the first chapter, Turkey 
was able to act as the most powerful state actor. The Syrian and Iraqi governments opposed 
this dominance of Turkey and both parties tried throughout the twentieth century to challenge 
this hegemony of Turkey. Sometimes Syria and Iraq came together to voice their opposition; 
at other times they used legal or international institutions to try to stop Turkish water plans.24 
Despite their effort to challenge the hydro-hegemony of Turkey, they were unable to enforce 
considerable changes to Turkish water policy. Over the last decades the idea that the 
Euphrates and the Tigris were national resources from Turkey, instead of transnational rivers, 
was normalized.25 Due to the political instability of Syria and Iraq, the outbreak of a major 
war and the rise of terrorist organizations, the limited state power over water politics of Syria 
and Iraq has now disappeared completely. A potential consequence of this shift in power 
dynamics is that Turkey is now able to implement its own water development plans without 
being held accountable or being challenged by any other party in the region. This is not an 
unlikely scenario considering the accumulation of chaos and misery within the Syrian and 
Iraqi borders and the preoccupation of state actors. It is however not the only scenario and that 
is why the second chapter demonstrates what role non-state actors are currently playing in the 
region and what their impact is or can be on the Turkish hydro-hegemony. The analysis 
reveals what actors are still in involved in the resistance against the Turkish water 
development plans, what mechanisms they use to challenge the hegemony and how successful 
they are in challenging the position and plans of the Turkish state. The actors central in this 
section are NGOs, Turkish and Iraqi civil society and Kurdish militant groups.  
  The third and final chapter analyses the response of the Turkish authorities to these 
hydro-hegemony challengers. The actions of non-state actors in challenging the position of 
the Turkish state naturally trigger a reaction of the hegemonic power. Whereas the second 
chapter focuses solely on the tactics and tools used by protest movements, the third chapter 
examines what counter tactics the Turkish government and the GAP administration use. The 
separation of action-reaction of non-state and state actors helps understand the power 
asymmetries between the involved parties and measure the final impact of non-state actors on 
the hydro-hegemony of Turkey in the period discussed.   
  The amount of literature and research on the topic and the fierce opposition against 
projects and dams that threaten to harm the quality or availability of water show that water, 
water management or water politics are crucial and can have serious implications, especially 
																																								 																				
24 Kibaroglu and Maden, “An analysis of the causes of water crisis,” 350.		
25 Hommes, Boelens and Maat, “Contested hydrosocial territories,” 11.  
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in the Middle East. The GAP is a very large, expensive and ambitious project that will not 
only have an impact on Turkey and its population but also on the lives of people in Syria and 
Iraq. It is important to demonstrate how Turkey deals with its water politics in times of crisis, 
especially considering that the absence of strong riparian states has lasted for quite a few 
years and might last for years to come. By analyzing the role of non-state actors this essay 
gives agency to actors on a different level, actors that might otherwise be neglected. This 
provides a perspective on water politics that can be useful for other cases where there is a 
dominant hydro-hegemon that is not successfully challenged by other state-actors, e.g. Israel 
and Palestine.  
  The availability of sources, or more specifically the availability of neutral sources is a 
potential limitation to this work. The information available, especially when it concerns the 
Kurdish question or environmental consequences, is rather black or white. Turkish 
governmental sources contain very different information from Kurdish human rights reports 
or environmentalist organizations. The same disunity of information can be found in 
interviews of local populations. Turkish authorities point to interviews that demonstrate the 
support of locals whereas NGOs use interviews to support their claim that the local population 
opposes the GAP.26 Different opinions about the Turkish water plans clearly exist but it is 
safe to say that organizations use information or sources to support their argument. Because 
this topic is not without controversy sources will be critically assessed and different 
perspectives or standpoints will be addressed if necessary. Due to a lacking proficiency of the 
Turkish language, most sources used in this essay are in English. This can be seen as 
problematic but fortunately most primary sources used, e.g. GAP reports, news articles and 
human rights reports, are available in English. The Turkish newspapers Daily Sabah Turkey 
and Hurriyet Daily are used for an insight into media coverage on the topic.27 Both these 
newspapers are digitally available, in English and represent different political ideologies. 
Daily Sabah Turkey is a pro-government newspaper whereas Hurriyet Daily News is a liberal, 
central-left newspaper that is more critical of the current Turkish government. Another 
limitation is formed by the fact that other issues in the region, such as security and political 
instability, have overshadowed water politics in the Euphrates and Tigris basin. Mark 
Dohrmann and Robert Hatem for instance argue that the importance of water in the region has 
																																								 																				
26	Ibid, 17. 	
27	Hurriyet Daily News: Leading News Source for Turkey and the Region, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/   
last accessed 27-05-2017, Daily Sabah: Breaking and Latest News from Turkey, https://www.dailysabah.com/ 
last accessed 27-05-2017.		
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decreased because other issues have become much more urgent.28 Although there are plenty 
of humanitarian, economic and political challenges in the region that have the ability to 
overshadow water politics, other authors argue that the importance of water during this times 
of crisis only increases. Tobias Von Lossow has demonstrated how and why IS has used the 
water resources it has captured in Syria and Iraq as a weapon in war.29 This weaponization of 
water can have terrible consequences and Von Lossow shows that it is not only IS that makes 
use of it but that all other parties in Iraq and Syria tend to use water as an instrument in war.30 
Jeroen Warner in an article written in 2012 concluded that the issues of water and national 
security are often linked in water poor states.31 Oppositional groups to the controversial Ilisu 
Dam on the Tigris have made the argument that the dam is a tool to stop Kurds in Turkey 
from connecting with and traveling to the Kurdish population in Syria and Iraq.32 Although 
the GAP administration clearly does not acknowledge these types of accusations it is believed 
that the increase of infrastructure in the Southeast region is supposed to increase border 
control and security.33 Chapter 3 analyzes this idea of the securitization of water issues. 
Arguably the instability within and across Turkish borders makes these issues of 
securitization and control even more urgent. Without trying to diminish the urgency or 
relevance of the crises within the region, this essay wants to demonstrate that water politics is 
not just about water but is connected to issues of security, economy and politics and so 
continues to be important in these chaotic times.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
28 Mark Dohrmann and Robert Hatem, “The Impact of Hydro-Politics on the Relations of Turkey, Iraq, and 
Syria,” The Middle East Journal 68-4 (2014): 567-583, 583.  
29 Tobias Von Lossow, “The Rebirth of Water as a Weapon: IS in Syria and Iraq,” The International Spectator 
51-3 (2016): 82-99, 87.  
30 Ibid, 91.  
31 Warner, “The struggle over Turkey’s Ilısu Dam,” 233.  
32 Ibid, 239.  
33 Harris, “Water and Conflict Geographies,” 755.  
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Theory- Hydro-Hegemony and the position of non-state actors  
   
  The scarcity and importance of water resources in the Middle East have intensified the 
interaction and cooperation between riparian states of river systems. The transboundary flow 
of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers through Turkey, Syria and Iraq has connected these three 
states since their creation. The relation between these riparian states concerning water 
recourses has been complex and other river basins across the globe have dealt with similar 
issues. To increase the understanding of the complex nature of riparian state relations 
frameworks have been created. Throughout this essay the framework that has been created by 
Mark Zeitoun, researcher at the Geography department at the University of East Anglia, and 
Jeroen Warner, researcher of Disaster Studies at Wageningen University, in 2006 will serve as 
a theoretical basis. In their article ‘Hydro-Hegemony- a Framework for Analysis of Trans-
Boundary Water Conflicts’ Zeitoun and Warner explain how one riparian state gains the 
position of Hydro-Hegemon and is able to overpower other states in the river basin.34 
According to the theory Turkey is the hydro-hegemon of the Euphrates and Tigris basin and 
dominates water agreements, cooperative initiatives and conflicts in the basin. Zeitoun and 
Warner claim that power asymmetries between riparian states result in unbalanced outcomes 
and persistent low-intensity conflicts.35 Although the framework that Zeitoun and Warner 
presented in 2006 provides a clear insight and understanding into the historical development 
of riparian relations in the Euphrates and Tigris basin in the 20th century, it is less workable in 
the current political climate of the region. The hydro-hegemony framework is based on the 
presence of state structures within the basin. It includes state actors only and measures 
compatibility and conflict between governments and state authorities. The aim of this essay is 
to analyze the role and impact of non-state actors in water affairs. The theory of Zeitoun and 
Warner will consequently not be completely discarded but will be altered by including non-
state actors. Before this altered framework is presented, it is necessary to look into the hydro-
hegemonic framework in a little more detail.  
  The reason that Turkey is able to dominate the Euphrates and Tigris River Basin is due 
to its geographical location, its exploitation potential and its power. Power is a term that can 
contain various definitions and meanings so it is crucial to be very clear about its value and 
																																								 																				
34	Zeitoun and Warner, “Hydro-Hegemony,” 452. 	
35	Ibid, 441. 	
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implications for this particular case. According to the hydro-hegemony theory power has three 
particular forms that combined work to shape the hydro-hegemon. The first form of power 
includes the material and immaterial capabilities of a state, e.g. military force, economic 
capacity or national and international political support. The second form of power is often less 
visible and refers to the ability to set the agenda, dominating joint cooperative talks or 
international treaties. The third and final dimension of power is control over the knowledge 
structure. This form of power goes beyond the other two power dimensions and refers to 
impacting and determining the dominant ideas of e.g. water affairs and international water 
cooperation.36  
Table 1. Dimensions of power of hydro-political actors  
Power  Meaning Example 
Dimension 1 Material & immaterial 
capabilities  
Riparian location, international 
(financial) support, military 
strength 
Dimension 2 Agenda setting Favorable treaties for Turkey 
i.c.t. Iraq and Syria 
Dimension 3 Determining knowledge 
structure 
Convince the international 
community to accept Tigris and 
Euphrates as national instead of 
international waters 	 			 Accumulating this power is not necessarily enough to safeguard ones position as the 
hydro-hegemon. The hegemon, or aspiring hegemon, needs tactics and tools to successfully 
use its power to dominate the other riparian actors. Zeitoun and Warner distinguish between 
coercive, utilitarian, normative and hegemonic mechanisms used to impact hydro-politics. It 
is clear from this distinction and the table down below that the hegemonic power has a 
multitude of tactics available to secure its position within the basin. Every state actor in a river 
basin has coercive, utilitarian and normative mechanisms at their service. It depends on the 
power position of the state whether these mechanisms can be successfully utilized. Military 
power for instance can be used by most states but the success rate depends on the quality and 
quantity of this power. The hegemonic power has additional mechanisms that it can utilize in 
order to control water resources, agreements and cooperation. The tactics of knowledge 
																																								 																				
36	Ibid, 442-443.	
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construction and sanctioned discourse both have to do with the creation of a discourse by the 
hegemonic actor and the adoption of this discourse by the international community or 
funders.37 Hegemonic actors can e.g. highlight their effort in regional cooperative initiatives 
but ignore their oppressive measures against citizens of riparian states. This is a mechanism 
used frequently by the Israeli state.38 
Table 2. Hydro-political mechanisms 
General mechanisms for riparian states Hegemonic mechanisms  
Coercive Utilitarian Normative Hegemonic 
- Military force 
- Covert action 
- Coercion/pressure 
- Incentives (diplomatic or 
economic)  
- Treaties - Securitization  
- Knowledge construction 
- Sanctioned discourse  
- International support 
- Coercive resources 
- Financial mobilization  
- Riparian position 
	
Although the mechanisms are in this case presented as state tools, they to a certain extent can 
also be applied to non-state actors. Although non-state actors cannot use direct diplomatic 
incentives, they are able to put pressure on countries and diplomatic staff. The same applies to 
the mechanism of closing treaties. Military power might be of a different nature for non-state 
actors but the use of violence and force is in reality not restricted to state authorities. Non-
state actors can, in theory, utilize the hegemonic tools of securitization, knowledge 
construction, sanctioned discourse and international and/or financial support.   
  The objective of this essay is to analyze the tactics and coercive mechanisms of non-
state actors in challenging the hydro-hegemony of Turkey in the Euphrates-Tigris basin. The 
chapters below give a clear understanding of the complexity of water politics in Turkey and 
the role of involved state and non-state actors. The analysis will not only provide insight in 
this particular case but adds to the general understanding of hydro-politics. The actions and 
reactions of actors in Turkey will be connected to the aforementioned tactics and coercive 
mechanisms and will be added to a new hydro-hegemony framework that includes non-state 
actors. 
																																								 																				
37 Ibid, 448.  
38 Ibid. 		
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Table 4 shows what the schematic display of this new framework will look like. The tools of 
non-state actors will be categorized along the lines of the coercive, utilitarian and normative 
mechanisms. This is done in order to facilitate a comparison between state and non-state 
hydro-political tactics and tools. 
Table 3. Hydro-political mechanisms of state and non-state actors  
 Non-hegemonic state 
actors 
Hegemonic state actor Non-state actors  
Coercive - Military force 
- Covert action 
- Coercion/pressure 
- Military force 
- Covert Action 
- Coercion/pressure 
- Riparian position 
- 
Utilitarian Incentives (economic and 
diplomatic)  
- Financial mobilization  
- International support  
- 
Normative Treaties - Securitization 
- Knowledge construction 
- Sanctioned discourse  
- 
 
Although this framework will be based on the case study of Turkey and the Euphrates-Tigris 
basin, it can provide insight into the functioning of hydro-politics globally. Especially in 
basins with a high degree of power asymmetry, e.g. Israel and Palestine or Egypt, Sudan and 
Ethiopia, it is useful to look at the potential power of non-state actors. The hydro-hegemony 
framework will not only be altered at the end of this analysis but the success rate of hydro-
political mechanisms by non-state actors in Turkey will be measured. In other words, were 
non-state actors successful in challenging the Turkish hydro-hegemony and if so, what tactics 
did or did not work? Although every river basin system has a different economic and political 
context, the case study of Turkey and the resistance against the GAP can provide a valuable 
example for other hydro-hegemony challengers.  
  The framework presented here runs like a red thread throughout this essay. It will be at 
times addressed or mentioned but the final completion and presentation of the new framework 
takes places at the end of the analysis. Before there can be any attempt at a successful 
framework alteration, it is necessary to submerge into the historic and political context of 
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riparian relations in the Tigris-Euphrates basin and of the non-state resistance against Turkish 
hydro-politics.   
 
Chapter 1- In control of the flow  
In order to gain a full understanding of water politics within Turkey and between the Tigris 
and Euphrates river basin riparian states, it is essential to look at the development of water 
affairs in this region throughout the twentieth century. The analysis below will explain the 
tensions between the riparian states, the position of Turkey as the hydro-hegemon of the basin 
and highlight the opposition from (non) state actors to the implementation of the Turkish 
water development program in the period 1980-2010. It includes a detailed analysis of the 
Ilisu Dam project, the most controversial project of the GAP, and provides the basis for the 
analysis of contemporary opposition in Turkey. This chapter provides a historic and 
theoretical understanding of the complexities of water affairs in the Tigris and Euphrates 
basin.   
Attempts at riparian cooperation  
Although the Euphrates and the Tigris spring in Turkey, they are border-crossing rivers that 
both flow through Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The transnational flow of these major rivers have 
naturally connected these three riparian states throughout the twentieth century and have 
forced them to find ways to manage water affairs on a national and international level.39 The 
interaction between the riparian states on water affairs went through different phases in the 
twentieth century. Water became an important issue in Turkey in the 1920s under the 
leadership of president Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). After the disaster of the Great War and its 
troubled aftermath Atatürk was determined to work towards Turkish development, 
independence and growth. In the 1930s he initiated plans to divert the major rivers of Turkey, 
the Tigris and the Euphrates, to enhance the economic development of the country.40  
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Image	1.	Tigris	and	Euphrates	River	Basin	 	
	
“Mesopotamian Vitality Falls to Turkey,” 5 January, 2015, Stratfor https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/mesopotamian-
vitality-falls-turkey last accessed 04-07-2017.  
 
  The water development plans that were initiated in Turkey in the first half of the 
twentieth century had no serious implications for Syria or Iraq. At that time the water 
resources in the riparian states were sufficient for their respective populations. Disputes 
between the states about the allocation of water therefore did not occur.41 During this period 
of relatively harmonious relations between the riparian states the first agreement between 
Turkey and Iraq that included water management was set up. In 1946 Iraq and Turkey signed 
the Treaty of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations.42 The treaty included a special 
protocol for the regulation of water of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. The protocol mainly 
concerned itself with the control of floods by both countries and specifically mentioned that 
facilities within Turkish borders would have the capacity and power to regulate the flow and 
have a positive impact on the water control in Iraq.43 The content of the treaty demonstrates 
that the relations between Turkey and Iraq concerning water were friendly and that there was 
mutual trust between the parties. The treaty also indicates that the issue of water was not very 
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political during this period. The actors mentioned in the 1946 treaty are all technical 
specialists and the treaty speaks of a collaboration between Turkish and Iraqi experts in order 
to collect hydraulic and geological information needed for the construction of dams and other 
works.44 It does not mention the involvement of political actors.  
 In the second half of the century the relations between the riparian states started to 
change, mainly due to the fact that Turkey, Syria and Iraq started developing large-scale water 
projects that could potentially impact their neighboring countries. The recent independence of 
Iraq and Syria contributed to the need for a quick industrialization and modernization of water 
utilization.45 Each riparian state started working on the construction of one major project, 
respectively the Keban Dam in Turkey, the Thartar Canal Project in Iraq and the Euphrates 
Valley Project in Syria. The Keban Dam was one of the three major dams that were built in 
Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s and it became one of the precursors for the GAP project. 
The Thartar Canal Project in Iraq was completed in 1956 and opened the Thartar Canal that 
connected the Tigris and Euphrates rivers via Lake Thartar and worked to stop flooding of the 
Tigris River and divert access water into the Euphrates.46 The Syrian Euphrates Valley Project 
was centered on the construction of the Tabqa Dam. The project started in 1963 and became 
operational in 1973. The aim of the project was large-scale irrigation of the land and electric 
energy generation.47 The projects of the riparian states were all aimed at development of the 
national economy, the energy supply and the agricultural sector. This pursuit of own 
development put some pressure on the relations between the riparian states. Iraq especially 
was concerned that the construction of the Keban and Tabqa Dams would impact the water 
flow within the Iraqi borders.48 Even though technical experts from the riparian states came 
together several times during the years to discuss these issues, they were unable to come to a 
final agreement.49 This period between 1950-1970 marked the beginning of strained relations 
between the states of the basin.  
  A few years after the completion of the large-scale water projects the riparian states 
set up a formal cooperative initiative to discuss water issues. In 1983 the Joint Technical 
Committee for Regional Waters (JTC) was created, consisting of technical members from the 
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three countries. The aim of the JTC was to discuss management methods and come to a 
definition for an adequate allocation of water between the member states involved.50  
Although the JTC met over a dozen times it was unable to come to concrete results and agree 
on the meaning of fair water sharing between the riparian states.51 Even though most 
participants of these meetings were technical experts, they did not take place in a vacuum and 
were in fact influenced by the political reality. The relations between the riparian states during 
the JTC period actually worsened. Turkey and Syria were not on good terms, mainly due to 
the support of the Syrian government to the Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK). These tensions 
between the riparian states had an effect on their joint effort to manage water politics and 
water became more and more a political issue instead of just a technological issue. Despite 
these difficulties new treaties between the riparian states were set up in the years that 
followed. In 1987 Syria and Turkey came to an agreement and three years later Iraq and Syria 
signed a water-accord. In the Turkish-Syrian Protocol on Economic Cooperation Turkey 
promised Syria a certain amount of water whilst Syria made promises concerning the security 
issues that had been at the basis of the tenuous political relations between the two states.52 
Although these accords may sound like a genuine attempt at cooperation, due to their limited 
content, their bilateral character and a lack of implementation and control, they did not 
amount to much.53 In the late 1990s and during the first decade of the new century the 
political relations between the riparian states improved and so did their willingness to 
cooperate and create a working framework for joint water management. This led to two new 
agreements in 2009 between Syria and Turkey and between Iraq and Turkey.   
Turkey as hydro-hegemon  
The analysis above shows that the riparian states were mostly concerned with the utilization 
of the water resources for their national benefit and that the political climate between the 
states gained an increasingly impact on the joint effort to manage water affairs. Even though a 
full-blown conflict concerning water between Turkey and the other states did not erupt during 
this period, there was a conflicted relationship between the states. Despite the fluctuations in 
cooperation-efforts one aspect remained constant: the dominance of Turkey over Syria and 
Iraq. In the case of the Tigris and Euphrates basin Turkey, due to its combined geographical 
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position, power and exploitation potential, was able to act as a hydro-hegemon over Syria and 
Iraq and demand the most during these cooperative initiatives.54  
 The dominance of Turkey became very clear from the 1980s onwards, after the formal 
launch of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP). The seeds that Atatürk had planted in the 
1930s grew out to be the biggest and most ambitious water development plan in Turkey and 
the surrounding region. The Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi is the full-grown version of the 
initial plan by Atatürk and although the scale has drastically increased, the intention remains 
the same. The aim of the GAP is to alter, use and store the water resources of the rivers to 
contribute to the development of Turkey and to increase the autarkic ability of the country. It 
was calculated that the implementation of this project would have serious implications for the 
water resources and water quality in Iraq and Syria. The direst estimates concluded that the 
flow of the Euphrates River could be reduced up to 40% for Syria and even 80% for Iraq.55 
On top of that the salination and pollution levels of the rivers would increase drastically.  
  The announcement of this major Turkish project naturally resulted in a fierce response 
and opposition from the Iraqi and Syrian governments.56 The governments even temporarily 
surpassed their mutual disagreements to unite in their opposition to this Turkish project. 
Despite this opposition and the serious consequences that were connected to the 
implementation of the GAP, the riparian states were unable to halt the project. Due to a lack 
of a legal framework on international water issues and the vague accords and agreements that 
did exist, Syria and Iraq had no instruments to obstruct the construction of the dams and 
hydropower plants. Turkey on the other hand, thanks to its upstream riparian position and its 
relative financial and political strength, was hegemonic in the early years of the GAP 
implementation. Turkish water politics did however not go completely unchallenged. Other 
actors, non-state actors, that were not included in official treaties or accords did challenge or 
tried to challenge the hydro-hegemony of Turkey in the 20th and beginning of the 21st century.  
The role of funders 
The reason that other actors got involved with the implementation of the GAP in the first 
place was the need for financial support of the project. The ambitious project came with a 
serious price tag. Instead of trying to finance the entire project with national means, the 
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Turkish government turned to international funders to collect the necessary resources.57 This 
however quickly became difficult because of the unwillingness of the Turkish government to 
come to an agreement with Syria and Iraq and make promises concerning their water 
security.58 The absence of a tripartite agreement was a deal breaker for several of the more 
traditional international funders, such as the European Union, the World Bank and the United 
Nations, to give financial support for the GAP.59 The GAP administration realized that in 
order to gain financial support from the international community it had to make some 
alterations to its proposed plans.  
  The original GAP project was mainly focused on economic development of the 
Southeastern Anatolia region, although it did already include marginal promises for 
educational and health sector improvement.60 This was not enough to convince foreign 
investors of the good nature and sustainable value of this project, especially considering the 
negative consequences for the other riparian states. The demand for funding was so high that 
the GAP administration decided to alter the original project by adding sustainable 
development goals. The happiness and development of the people instead of just the 
economic growth was put at the center of the GAP and programs concerned with gender 
equality, environmental improvement and educational progress were added.61 The adoption of 
this broader program made international funders much more willing to offer their support to 
the GAP. According to the GAP administration: 
Adopting the innovative philosophy of sustainable humanitarian development, the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) has attracted an international interest while  technical 
and financial contributions from foreign countries and institutions has risen therewith since 
1995.62  
 
Besides this financial reason to alter the program there was also a political motive to adopt 
changes. The talks between the EU and Turkey about admission of Turkey to the union were 
taking place and the international criticism on the GAP did not benefit the Turkish case.63 In 
the years that followed several international funders, such as the World Bank, the European 
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Union and the UNDP, gave grants or loans to support projects that specifically targeted the 
living conditions of the people of the Southeastern Anatolia region.64 They did remain 
hesitant to provide financial support for the actual construction of dams and hydropower 
plants that potentially damaged Syria and Iraq. The World Bank for instance, due to the 
sensitive nature of the project, was only willing to give a loan for the Health Services and 
Management Development project and two grants for the development of the urban and rural 
infrastructure in the region.65 These projects were strictly concerned with Turkish 
development and did not impact the riparian states in any negative way. The GAP 
administration had to turn to other partners to find funding for more controversial projects. 
  The period between 1980 and 2000 was characterized by fierce resistance to the GAP 
project by riparian states Syria and Iraq and an unwillingness of international funders to get 
involved in such a controversial project. In the 1990s Turkey realized that the success of the 
project was dependent on foreign investment and loans and that it could, by adopting 
sustainable human development goals, improve the reputation of the project and attract more 
money. The direct power of Syria and Iraq to influence the project was very limited but by 
expressing their grievances to an international audience they were able to halt some funding 
for parts of the project. The GAP administration was however quick in countering this 
development. By using popular language and trends about sustainable development and 
progress the GAP administration was able to appeal to western financial supporters and side-
line the opposition of the riparian states. This period is a conformation of the hydro-hegemony 
theory as Zeitoun and Warner present it. With the inclusion of non-state actors however it 
becomes clear that Turkey was in fact challenged in its hegemony. The opposition did not 
stop the GAP but the aims of the project were quite drastically changed or at least broadened 
due to the pressure of the international community and funders.  
The rise of non-state protest 
The water development plans of Turkey did not only receive criticism from international 
opponents. The domestic opposition to the GAP was strong and widespread. The earliest 
opposition to the GAP came from Kurdish organizations and protectors of Kurdish human 
rights within Turkey. Due to the location of the planned dams and constructions, it was 
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believed by opponents that the project was aimed at undermining the Kurdish region and 
increase state control over Kurdish territory.66 Besides this Kurdish opposition, the resistance 
against the GAP came from environmentalists, human right activists, academics and 
protectors of cultural and historical heritage. The project that became the center of protest of 
non-state actors in Turkey was the controversial Ilisu Dam. 
Image 2. Planned and operational dams of the GAP 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Dams power Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds,” 23 June, 2016, Stratfor https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/dams-power-
turkeys-conflict-kurds last accessed 03-07-2017.  
 
The Ilisu Dam  
The Ilisu Dam was planned to be the first dam on the Tigris river and the most expensive and 
perhaps most ambitious project of the GAP.67 There were several attempts to start the 
construction of the Ilisu Dam in the 1990s but due to its controversial nature the GAP 
administration was unable to gather the financial means necessary. In 1996 there was a lack of 
investors and two years later the European funding that was promised was pulled back due to 
international pressure.68 For the third attempt Turkey again looked at European partners for 
support. Although Turkey did find some willing partners, under pressure of international and 
national campaigns, the Export Credit Agencies of Austria, Switzerland and Germany 
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withdrew their approval of the project.69 It was a massive blow to the Ilisu Dam when in 2001 
the British Balfour Beatty, one of the biggest European supporters of the Ilisu Dam, withdrew 
its financial support. Impregilo, the Italian partner of Balfour Beatty followed the British 
example and also decided to drop the project. The reasons for the withdrawal were the 
commercial, social and environmental concerns.70 The British government, under Tony Blair, 
had till that moment been a leading supporter of the Turkish GAP project but the international 
and national opposition to the dam had become so extensive that they could no longer ignore 
it. The involved NGOs and cooperative initiatives from Turkish and international activists had 
worked tirelessly to obstruct the European finance of the Ilisu Dam. It was the first major 
success of non-state actors to challenge the hydro-hegemony of Turkey.   
  So what made this particular project so prone to protest? There had been allegations 
against the GAP administration about its discriminative nature from the very start of the 
project. It was not until the Ilisu Dam however that the negative consequences of GAP 
projects became clear to a much larger audience. As a result of the construction of the Ilisu 
Dam approximately 200 towns would disappear, several thousand people would be forced to 
move, the biodiversity of the region would be damaged and the ancient Assyrian settlement of 
Hasankeyf would be flooded.71 So the consequences of the Ilisu Dam appealed to activists 
with an environmental, cultural or ethnic conviction. This diversity in impact resulted in much 
stronger campaigns against the dam. Because of the involvement of European money in this 
project, European NGOs got involved as well. One of the biggest campaigns against the Ilisu 
Dam, the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, was set up in 2006. Another example of 
opposition came from the Ilisu Dam Campaign, set up to stop British involvement in the 
project that was created as a cooperative initiative of the Corner House and the Kurdish 
Human Rights Project.72 These campaigns did not only voice their opposition but conducted 
fact finding missions to reveal the effects of the Ilisu Dam.73  
  The fact finding missions that were carried out by the British NGOs concluded that the 
impact of the GAP project and the Ilisu Dam was significant on the population of Turkey as 
well as on the people of Syria and Iraq. Even before the construction of the Ilisu Dam, the 
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GAP projects had caused increased salinity of the rivers.74 The NGOs also concluded that 
Turkey was in violation of several principles and legal regulations by continuing its GAP 
implementation without the consultation with the other riparian states.75 The report stated that 
collaboration between the riparian states was indeed possible and that Syria and Iraq already 
had a well-working system of consultations on water affairs. It reinforced the conclusions of 
the World Commission on Dams (WCD) that water conflicts were based on imbalanced 
power relations. In the year 2000 the World Commission on Dams, which was initiated in 
1997 by a joint cooperation of the World Bank and the World Conservation Union, published 
a final report about the decision-making and management of dams on a global scale.76 One of 
the issue concerning international water affairs was and still is the fact that there is a lack of 
global regulations and a legal framework. The World Commission on Dams did not provide 
this either but their published report was used as a basic framework for decision-making on 
water and dam issues in the years that followed. The WCD of course mentioned the 
controversy that surrounded the Ilisu Dam and was particularly critical at the European Credit 
Agencies (ECA) for lacking environmental and social conditions.77 The protests surrounding 
the Ilisu Dam were an example of public discontent with the lack of regulations and 
environmental standards of the ECA’s.78 The WCD report’s recommendations emphasized the 
importance of gaining acceptance of the public and recognizing the rights of the indigenous 
people as well as environmental protection and sustainable ecosystems.79 Although the report 
only mentioned the Ilisu project a few times, its focus was on other case studies, the criticism 
and conclusions could be directly applied to the Turkish case.    
  The period from the 1990s onwards was characterized by a rise of local, national and 
international opposition to the GAP. The efforts of these non-state actors to oppose the plans 
were not without success. The cooperation between local and European activists became a 
powerful tool to prove the environmental and human rights consequences that were connected 
to the GAP. The withdrawal of financial support from the British, Austrian, German and 
Swiss governments and banks was celebrated as an important victory for NGO cooperative 
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initiatives.80  
  This victorious joy did however not last long. Despite the great effort of various 
oppositional groups the Turkish government continued to implement the GAP projects 
without any alterations. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the impacts of 
the Ilisu Dam were overrated and misleading information about the dam was being spread.81 
The Turkish state concluded that the Ilisu Dam would only flood lower Hasankeyf and that 
most of its historical value would be preserved. It also argued that around 15.000 people of 
various ethnicities would be resettled but that they would get full support of the officials. The 
government claimed that this was a small price to pay for further economic and sustainable 
development of the region that would improve the lives of all people of the region.82 Because 
the global institutions and international state actors were unwilling or incapable of publicly 
supporting the project, the GAP administration turned to public-private funding that was less 
tight to international regulations and objections.83 Currently the construction of the Ilisu Dam 
is well underway thanks to co-finance by Austrian company Andritz that has 340 million 
euros invested in the Ilisu Project.84 The completion of the dam is however still facing 
difficulties. Attacks on dams and hydropower plants claimed by the PKK are widespread and 
the deadline of the Ilisu Dam has been pushed back several times due to local protests and 
attacks of militant Kurdish groups.85 Even though the possibility of obstructing the 
completion of this particular project is very small, some oppositional groups are still trying to 
resist. The continuation of this oppositional movement will be analysed in the next chapter. 
  So what can be concluded about the impact of non-state actors on Turkish water 
policy in the period before 2010? The involved non-state actors, funders, NGOs and local 
activist were not completely without power in this period. They were able to mobilize a 
substantial group of people and gather support for their case outside the borders of the basin. 
The issues they were facing had an international appeal and thanks to the involvement of 
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European NGOs the international community became aware of the Ilisu Dam campaigns. The 
focus of the non-state protestors was however not really directed at the Turkish government or 
the GAP administration but mainly concerned itself with convincing European actors to 
withdraw their financial support. Their efforts were backed by the international organizations 
and reports that supported the environmental and social arguments of the protestors. 
Influencing the European parties was a relatively successful undertaking and their success 
delayed the construction of the dam for several years. Nevertheless their inability to influence 
the GAP administration itself was their downfall. Although the hydro-hegemony of Turkey 
was for a brief period challenged by the absence of money, the GAP administration was able 
to overcome this obstacle and continue the implementation of the Ilisu Dam as planned. 
Table 4. The impact of different actors on Turkish water politics period 1980-2010 
Actor Impact  Positive  Negative  
International 
community 
Alterations to GAP Responsible for broader 
approach of the 
GAP/adopting sustainable 
and human development 
goals 
Alterations remained 
superficial and the 
project remained 
controversial 
NGOs Causing delay  Able to withdraw 
European financial support 
and raise international 
awareness 
Unable to convince 
the Turkish GAP of an 
alteration in their 
plans.  
Kurdish militant groups Causing delay Direct impact on the 
construction progress of 
dams 
Reinforced the idea 
that Turkey is dealing 
with security issues.  
Funders Causing delay Cause serious setbacks to 
the implementation of 
GAP plans 
The Turkish 
government decided to 
finance the project 
itself 
   
  Although the momentum of the Ilisu Dam controversy was lost after 2009, the 
opposition to the Turkish GAP remained in place and new actors emerged that would further 
complicate the relations between the Turkish state and oppositional groups. The following 
chapters will analyze contemporary non-state resistance against the hydro-hegemony of 
Turkey and addresses the complex relations between Kurdish opposition and the water 
development projects.		
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Chapter 2- The challengers 	
‘The Kurdish movement has decided not to accept this treatment any more, and to mobilize all 
means necessary, including the guerrilla forces, to stop the construction of all dams.’86   
  
      Kurdistan Communities Union, July 12 2015	
The previous chapter revealed how the Turkish state secured its hydro-hegemonic position 
vis-à-vis Syria and Iraq and how various civil groups, international NGOs and foreign funders 
tried to challenge this hegemony in the period 1980-2010. This chapter builds on this analysis 
and focusses on contemporary non-state resistance against the Turkish hydro-hegemony, 
hereby concentrating on the implementation of the GAP. By analyzing the tools and 
mechanisms used by non-state actors in challenging the Turkish authorities, this chapter 
provides the basis for the proposed alteration of the hydro-hegemonic theoretical framework. 
The focus on period 2010-2017 is chosen due to its relevance, its complexity and its academic 
rarity. The collapse of the Syrian state, the eruption of war and chaos in Iraq and the 
resurgence of a militant conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK have created a 
vastly different political context within the Tigris-Euphrates river basin. These changes have 
opened up some - and closed other opportunities for non-state actors to challenge the hydro-
hegemony. The analysis below will reveal the scope and intensity of current-day resistance, 
whereas the following chapter will research the response of the Turkish government to these 
hegemony-challengers.   
  A part of this chapter is devoted to the resistance of militant Kurdish groups because 
they currently are the most persistent and active non-state actors. Although the actions of the 
groups discussed are regarded as extreme and are rejected, the aim of this chapter is to show 
that the argumentation that is behind the actions aimed at the GAP is not unfounded but 
rooted in the historical and political context of the Turkish state. The resistance that is 
discussed below is often not just directed towards the GAP or Turkish water development 
plans but includes dissatisfaction with state control, economics and politics. Despite this 
broadened discussion, the emphasis in this analysis remains on Turkey as the hydro-hegemon 
and the implementation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. All measures and protests that 
are analyzed can be linked to water development plans or specifically the GAP but many are 
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obviously part of a wider (inter)national political struggle. Although these political 
circumstances are not at the heart of this research, they are incorporated to a certain extent in 
order to reveal the complex connections between issues of water and security, politics and 
economics within Turkey.  
NGOs and civil society  
The resistance against the GAP in the beginning of the 21st century was often a joint effort by 
national and international NGOs. The involvement of European NGOs was aimed at the 
withdrawal of European finance in the GAP projects. Although there is still a large sum of 
European money involved in the GAP, e.g. €14 million EU funding for ‘Project of Mitigating 
Flood Risk in Flooded Areas in GAP Region’ or €43,5 million for the ‘GAP Regional 
Development Programme’87, the funding for the controversial Ilisu Dam was largely halted. 
This success also had a downside to it. The momentum around the Ilisu Dam and the GAP in 
2002-2009 in Europe came to an abrupt end. Involved organizations such as the Ilisu Dam 
Campaign, Kurdish Human Rights Project and Corner House are still in existence but became 
rather passive after 2010. The necessity for active participation of these organizations 
diminished when a majority of European money was withdrawn. This loss of active 
participation by European NGOs was substituted by regional cooperative campaigns. In 
March 2012 a new campaign was launched by a coalition of Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian civil 
society organizations. The campaign, named Save the Tigris and the Iraqi Marshes, is an 
advocacy campaign battling against the construction of large projects and dams on the Tigris 
and Euphrates.88    
  The campaigns have been directed towards various actors and aspects of the GAP but 
the core has been and remains centered around the Ilisu Dam and the flooding of Hasankeyf. 
A few years ago the protest aimed at getting the town of Hasankeyf on the UNECO World 
Heritage List.89 This was rejected in 2016 because a formal application by the Turkish state 
was not achieved. Another, more official, form of protest that the campaigners took on 
concerned the legality of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. Already in the early 2000s 
activists turned to the European Court of Human Rights to stop the construction of the dam 
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because of the irrevocable damage to archeological sites. This case is still ongoing.90 In 2013 
the highest Turkish administrative court ruled in favor of the opposition movement when it 
declared that the environmental impact assessment requirements for the construction were not 
met and called for an immediate halt of the construction.91 In 2014 the construction resumed 
nevertheless.  
Zeynel Bey Tomb  
In recent months the campaign has directed its arrows towards the relocation of the Zeynel 
Bey Tomb in Hasankeyf. The mausoleum of Zeynel Bey was erected in 1474 and is a unique 
part of the cultural and historic heritage of the area. Its relocation was seen as the start of the 
destruction of Hasankeyf as a heritage site. The Save the Tigris campaign and other local 
NGOs tried to stop the relocation and urged Dutch company Bresser Eurasia and the Greek 
company Korres Engineering to halt their involvement in the project.92 In an open letter to the 
companies, involved civil society organizations asked for complete withdrawal.  
Your firms’ assistance in the relocation of the Zeynel Bey Tomb provides critical support to 
the Ilisu Project, one of the most controversial dam projects in the world and the subject of 
extensive domestic and international criticism. […] To continue your involvement in this 
project, would, in our view, leave Bresser Eurasia and Korres Engineering open to the charge 
of being party to the destruction of a monument with outstanding cultural value, with 
consequent reputational risks. 93 
The letter was signed by the representatives from the Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive, 
Mesopotamian Ecology Movement, Hasankeyf Matters, Save the Tigris and Iraqi Marshes 
Campaign, Iraqi Civil Society Solidarity Initiative, The Corner House, Peace in Kurdistan 
Campaign, Counter Current, International Rivers, Riverwatch, Xarxa per una Nova Cultura de 
l’Aigua, Un Ponte Per and Both ENDS.94 The list of signatories did not only include Turks 
and Iraqis but also included several Dutch and British directors of organizations.  
  Despite this long list of involved NGOs in this protection campaign for the Zeynel 
Bey Tomb the project was implemented. On May 12th 2017 a team of over 50, mostly Turkish 
and Dutch, specialists, successfully moved the Zeynel Bey Tomb. Veysel Eroğlu, Minister of 
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Forestry and Water affairs responded to the successful operation by saying: ‘Europe was 
against this dam. But we will move eight other artifacts. This will set a model for the world’.95 
Although this operation was successful in the sense that the Tomb suffered no damage, it 
remained controversial. Vahap Kusen, mayor of Hasankeyf, was more critical in his response 
to the move. He compared the operation to ‘a flower that was broken off from its twig’ and 
shared his disappointment about the fact that not all artefacts could be rescued.96 The 
Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive responded to the move by stating that: ‘this step is clear 
disrespectfulness and a crime against history and cultural heritage. We will follow up this case 
with all legal and democratic means’.97  
  Although the opposition was unsuccessful in stopping the Zeynel Bey Tomb 
relocation, it has not given up on its campaign directed towards Dutch company Bresser. In 
late June 2017 a group of protesters affiliated with several national and international NGOs 
came together at the headquarter of Bresser in ‘s-Gravendeel to demand withdrawal.98 Bresser 
is planning to assist in the relocation of five other cultural heritage artefacts in the Hasankeyf 
region. According to the Save The Tigris campaign ‘their relocation would be an unforgivable 
act of cultural heritage destruction and a violation of the human rights of the local people, and 
facilitate far-reaching and irreversible impacts along the Tigris basin’.99   
  In addition to these specific campaigns the local NGOs try to provide transparency 
around the GAP. The campaigns in the region are mainly focused on advocacy and 
awareness. Although this might sound like an easy undertaking, the reality in the Southeast 
Anatolia region makes it rather difficult. The authorities are not keen on transparency when it 
comes to the Ilisu project and the developments around Hasankeyf. On May 8 2017, a 
photographer from National Geographic was detained because he tried to take pictures of 
New Hasankeyf, the settlement that is supposed to house the people that are forced to move. 
The photographer, Mathias Depardon, was arrested because he was suspected of terrorist 
propaganda.100 The area around Hasankeyf has become increasingly militarized and closed 
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off. The security personnel in the area have frequently interfered with photographers and 
journalists in the region, denying them access.101 The lack of official information of the 
process of the projects makes it impossible to judge the legitimacy of the undertakings. That 
is why the NGOs work towards complete transparency around the implementation of the 
GAP.  
  It is interesting to look at the participating organizations in the Save the Tigris 
campaign. Despite the relevance of the issue at hand for Turkish citizens, there is an 
underrepresentation of Turkish organizations involved. The majority of the parties involved in 
the joint initiative are from Iraq. The Initiative to Keep Hasankeyf Alive is the only Turkish 
organization represented. Although this initiative includes 86 different member organizations, 
e.g. municipalities, local women organizations or cultural centers, and is one of the broadest 
environmentalist movements in the Turkish Kurdish region, its reach remains small.102 The 
core of this NGO resistance movement can be found in Iraq. In Iraq the relation between the 
non-state actors and governmental authorities concerning water affairs is less tense. At the 
end of May 2017 representatives of Iraqi activist groups were given the opportunity to discuss 
water affairs with Hassan Al Janabi, the Iraqi minister of Water Resources.103 During this 
meeting Al Janabi and the representatives of the Save the Tigris and Iraqi Marshes Campaign 
discussed the organization of a regional water forum in April 2018 to debate on regional water 
concerns and potential solutions.104 Al Janabi showed great willingness to discuss water 
affairs and was pleased with the interest in - and enthusiasm for solving water-related 
conflicts and questions among activist groups. This amicability between government and civil 
society, the ministry of Water Resources even has a special department for cooperation with 
civil society and communities, is very different than the relation between these parties in 
Turkey. This can be explained by the fact that the non-sate and state actors in Iraq are both 
non-hydrohegemonic powers and share their opposition against the GAP, even though the 
government is less open in voicing its disapproval. Al Janabi and Turkish minister Veysel 
Eroğlu recently had a private meeting to discuss water affairs that was seen as a diplomatic 
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effort to come to an agreement about water sharing after the completion of the Ilisu Dam and 
diminish the negative effects of the dam on the Iraqi river flows.105 
Civil society tradition in Turkey 
In a series of interviews conducted in 2014 by Leila Harris, one of the leading scholars on 
environmental issues in Turkey, it became clear that these issues in Turkey and especially the 
Southeastern Anatolia region are fundamentally connected to social issues. The respondents 
naturally connected issues of water and the environment to issues concerning East-West 
relations both within and outside of Turkey and Kurdish-Turkish problematics.106 The 
interconnection between environmental issues and human rights and violence was particular 
dominant in the interviews with Kurdish citizens.  
  Despite this emotional undertone of the issue, there is a serious lack of organized 
protest or resistance against the GAP. This does not necessarily have to do with a lack of 
interest or opinion but is based on the historical development of the region. For a long time it 
was prohibited in the Southeast to demonstrate and have public gatherings and it was 
dangerous to have organized protests.107 The lacking tradition still has implications today. 
According to one respondent: ‘Participating in civil rights organizations still builds fear in 
people. ... I think this is the difference of Diyarbakır.’108   
  The fear to openly voice environmental issues is not completely groundless. In 2013 
when a protest in Turkey broke out because building plans were introduced on one of the last 
green spaces in Istanbul, the response by the authorities was fierce. Daily Sabah Turkey 
responded to the protests by stating that: ‘A small group of ordinary citizens seeking to raise 
environmental concerns started the protests. Erdoğan's opponents, ultra secular elitists, ultra 
nationalists and marginal leftist groups hijacked it.’109 Media outlets gave different accounts 
of the Gezi protests, some focusing on the police brutality and peaceful nature of the 
protestors, others emphasizing the extreme nature of the demonstration and the fitting 
governmental response to the outbreak.110  
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  The current political climate in Turkey has resulted in a limited freedom of expression 
for journalists and activists, especially concerning human- and cultural rights violations.111 
Although this development is beyond the scope of this essay, it is clear that there is not a 
favorable climate in Turkey for people to voice their critical remarks. The tightening grip of 
the Turkish government on civil society is likely to increase the fear in people for 
participating in protest movements.   
  The NGOs responsible for the resistance against the GAP in and around Turkey are 
small but persistent and have combined their forces to increase their impact. Despite this joint 
effort their power is limited. The NGOs have very limited resources to seriously challenge the 
hydro-hegemony of the Turkish state. The letter send to involved companies was unable to 
prevent the relocation of the Zeynel Bey tomb.112 The NGOs were also unable to realize a 
quick release of the photographer Mathias Depardon. Depardon was released on June 9th, after 
President Macron personally discussed the matter with President Erdoğan.113 The tendency to 
arrest journalists and photographers working in the region because of terrorist propaganda or 
connections to the PKK makes it more difficult for people to raise awareness and address 
issues concerning the GAP. The NGOs are in that sense successful because they still provide 
news and information about the projects and developments. The already limited tradition in 
Turkey of civil- and environmentalist movements is obstructed by the tense political climate 
in Turkey and the continued conflict in the Southeast region. So although there is peaceful 
resistance against the GAP in and around Turkey, it is currently unable to bring about serious 
changes. The next section will discuss the impact of more violent approaches in the region, 
but first gives a short introduction to the complexity of Kurdish-Turkish relations.  
Kurdish resistance  
As previously mentioned, Kurdish organizations in Turkey took on a leading role in 
protesting the GAP from the start. The relation between the Turkish government and the 
Kurdish citizens is too complicated to fully explain in this essay but a short overview of the 
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Turkish-Kurdish conflict is necessary in order to understand the dominance of Kurdish 
opposition against the GAP.  
Kurds and the AKP  
  After the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 a policy of Turkification was 
installed by the national elite. Convinced that the European-style nation state was the way 
forward, parties became convinced that an ethnic-homogeneous state was necessary. 
Turkification policy was directed towards ethnic minorities in Turkey, such as the Kurds, the 
Circassians and Arabs.114 This policy basically aimed to assimilate minorities and diminish 
the rights of certain groups. Throughout the 20th century the intensity of this policy fluctuated 
depending on the party in charge. When the AKP came to power in 2002 it was the first time 
that an active new process was started to halt assimilation politics and grant minorities and 
especially the Kurds more rights.115  
  Although the AKP promised to make changes during its victory in 2002, the reality 
did not show any significant alterations or improvements. In 2005 Erdoğan gave a famous 
speech in Diyarbakir, in which he distanced himself from historic ill treatment of Kurds in 
Turkey and proclaimed a new policy directed towards protection and expansion of Kurdish 
cultural rights. It was not until the elections of 2007 however that the government adopted 
formal policy aimed at improving regional-ethnic cultural rights.116 Under the header 
‘Democratisation Package’ the AKP government introduced several reforms that gave more 
cultural rights to minorities in Turkey. The reforms allowed for the return of Kurdish names 
of towns and people, the use of the Kurdish language in private schools and the approval of 
Kurdish for political purpose and propaganda.117 Although not all regulations worked in 
reality, there were vast improvements in Kurdish media and broadcasting and a rise in 
Kurdish names.   
   There seems to be a strong contrast between the abovementioned achievements of the 
AKP and the opposition against the party and the GAP. So how can this paradox be 
explained? When the GAP adopted its human development program people were very 
skeptical. Promises had been made before but real improvement was rarely the outcome. 
Although some came to be in favor of the GAP and the economic benefits it brought, other 
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feared that the economic improvement was just a tool to pacify the region and undermine the 
regional, political opposition.118 Economic hardship was often seen as the main cause for 
Kurdish opposition, by taking this away people feared that the region would become 
compliant. But the complains were not only about the sudden economic interest in the region. 
The opposing groups were mainly worried about the increasing presence of the state in the 
region. Although most Kurdish opposition groups have abandoned the ideal of an independent 
nation state, they do still strive towards increasing autonomy and rights within the Turkish 
state. So even though some of the proposed and implemented plans legally protect Kurdish 
cultural rights, it is seen as a state interference. The involvement of the GAP, and thereby the 
government, in education, health and the labor market is seen as a way to legitimize state 
authority in the region and increase the dependency of the Kurdish population in the 
Southeast region.119 The infrastructure of the GAP is seen as a way to destroy cultural 
heritage and relocate the Kurdish population in order to undermine historic and communal 
links to the land in the Southeast region.120 With the arrival of the Syrian refugees and the 
statement of the GAP administration that the need for development in the region is only 
increasing, the control of the government over the region is growing whilst the voice of the 
Kurdish opponents is overshadowed by other problematics.  
Resurgence of PKK violence  
The conflict between the Turkish government and the militant Kurdish groups in the 
Southeast of the country has had highs and lows in the 20th and 21st century. After the second 
insurgency between 2004-2012 it looked like the situation between the opposing parties 
stabilized. In 2013 and 2014 the tensions decreased and efforts to come to a more sustainable 
solution were resumed. This semi-stable period was however short-lived. A resurgence of the 
militant conflict between the Turkish authorities and the PKK erupted in late 2014. Because 
of the conflict in Syria and Iraq the actions of the Turkish authorities against Kurds across the 
borders were closely examined and criticized and they provoked protests.121 When the 
Turkish state refused to defend Kobani, a Syrian Kurdish town, against attacks from IS in 
June 2015, the Kurdish resentment against the state grew. The solidarity between Kurds 
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across the region was reinforced.122 Abdullah Ocalan, PKK leader, still tried to save the 
situation in early 2015 by calling for a unified struggle against IS but a few months later the 
resurgence of military conflict between the Turkish state and militant Kurdish groups was a 
fact.123  
  Although clearly not all violence that erupted in the region was directed towards the 
Turkish water development plans, the insurrection in the region did coincide with attacks on 
the GAP and its personnel. Between August and December 2014 the PKK attacked the Ilisu 
Dam construction site, spread anti-dam propaganda and kidnapped two subcontractors 
working on the GAP.124 The construction work in the region had to be put down for a couple 
of months because of these militant actions.125 After this break the work was resumed but it 
continued with a few alterations. A majority of the personnel involved with the construction 
had resigned out of fear. The kidnapped subcontractors were replaced and the new personnel 
that were hired came from other parts of the country and were not Kurdish.126 The PKK 
attacks also provoked a fierce military response by the Turkish state. Over 600 soldiers were 
sent to the region to assist the 1000 soldiers that had been there before in supervising and 
protecting the Ilisu Dam construction site and the surrounding area.127 The militarization of 
the area also included the use of local militias and the deployment of tanks in safeguarding the 
construction and the involved employees.128   
  Many in the region viewed the response by the Turkish authorities in horror. Ercan 
Ayboga, one of the leading opponents of the Ilisu Dam and head of the Initiative to keep 
Hasankeyf alive, stated that the militarization of the region would lead to an increase in 
human right violations and called for a joint effort by civil society and policy makers within 
and outside of Turkey to stop the completion of the projects.129  
While in the past years we emphasized the social, cultural and ecological impacts, the latest 
developments show us what potential the Ilisu Dam can create in terms of increasing the 
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existing political and social conflicts. We would now need political pressure on Turkey more 
than ever.130  
 
The actions of the PKK in late 2014 against the GAP were not incidental. When the peace-
effort between the Turkish government and the militant Kurdish groups came to an official 
end in mid-2015 the rhetoric of the opposing group sharpened. In July 2015 the Kurdistan 
Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organization that includes the PKK, released a 
statement that made clear that the fight against Turkish authorities and the Southeastern 
Anatolia Project would be intensified.131 The statement confirmed the KCU’s view that the 
goal of the dams was to displace Kurdistan’s people, that the increasing control and 
militarization was a preparation for war and rejected claims that the dams were in favor of the 
Kurdish population. According to the KCU: ‘even if there is a referendum held on the issue, 
90 percent of the Kurdistan people will say no to the dams which are being turned into a 
graveyard for the Kurdish people’.132 The KCU stated that the Turkish authorities had 
misused the ceasefire period by increasing their military presence in the region:  
The Turkish state took advantage of the cease-fire conditions not for a democratic political 
resolution but to gain an advantageous position in preparation for war by building dozens of 
guard posts, roads for military purposes and dams in order for a cultural genocide.133 
 
The KCU also warned for increasing attacks on dams as a direct response to the mistreatment 
of the ceasefire conditions by the Turkish authorities. The language used and the actions 
propagated are rather extreme. Speaking of ‘cultural genocide’ is a hefty accusation and ties 
to the development of securitization of the discourse that will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the next chapter.  
  Although the case of the Ilisu Dam attacks and militarization can be seen as a response 
from the Turkish government to radical attacks, other examples show that the timeline of the 
(re)actions are more complicated. In May 2014 protests broke out in the area surrounding the 
Silvan Dam in the province of Diyarbakir. In late 2013 the state started constructing a 
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gendarmerie post in the region to provide security for the Silvan hydroelectric plant.134 
Although some of the protestors came from radical groups, others had full support from 
regional representatives. Zübeyde Zümrüt, local head of the Peace and Democracy Party 
(BDP) responded to the activities of the Turkish authorities in a similar manner as the KCU, 
although she used a more toned down rhetoric. She stated: ‘The gendarmerie posts that are 
currently being built are contrary to the dialogue and negotiation process launched with the 
democratic process a year-and-a-half ago. Post constructions should be halted and the village 
guard [system] abolished.’135 The Silvan protestors were especially concerned about the 
reestablishment of the village guard system that many believed was a continuation of historic 
control and subversion of the region.136  
  The statement of the KCU was not just tough rhetoric but predicted a resurgence of 
violence in the region. According to data research by the International Crisis Group over 2700 
people were killed since the resurgence of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish 
government.137 This includes more than 900 security personnel, e.g. police officers, soldiers 
and village guards, and over 1200 PKK militants. The majority of these attacks took place in 
Diyarbakir, Sirnak and Hakkari. Although these attacks are not all connected to the GAP, they 
do include attacks on construction sites, dams and security personnel surrounding the GAP 
projects. In Dargecit, the location of the Ilisu Dam, 24 people were killed. In Silvan, home of 
the Silvan Dam, 39 people lost their lives. In the area surrounding the Batman Dam over 15 
were killed.138 Haci Bayram Tonbul, who is the head of the energy workers union, stated that 
the delays of the Ilisu Dam cost the Turkish government around 1 million dollars a day. 
According to Tonbul: "The terrorist group abducts workers and engineers, sets fire to the 
construction equipment and lays explosives on the dam roads, in order to block the 
construction of the dam projects."139 This is not only causing delay to the projects and so 
leads to extra costs but also results in an increasing fear amongst involved partners and 
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personnel. The Silvan and Ilisu Dam construction were temporarily shut down because 34 
governmental officers handed it their resignation due to safety issues.140  
Cooperation civil society and the PKK  
The resistance by non-state actors against Turkey as the hydro-hegemon can be divided into 
two main groups, the NGOs and civil society and the resistance led by Kurdish militant 
groups. The involved NGOs are collaborative initiatives combining the forces of human rights 
advocates and environmental and cultural organizations, but they are completely separated 
from the militant branch of resistance. The overall objectives of these two groups do not 
always match but they do share a similar opposition against the implementation of GAP 
projects. There is very little information available about the relations between the involved 
NGOs and the militant groups. The organizations do not mention the PKK or any militant 
groups as ‘relevant actors’ in the discussion of water affairs.141 The Save The Tigris campaign 
only states that the construction of the Ilisu Dam will lead to extra political instability in 
Turkey because of the militant responses of the PKK to the dam construction. The 
construction of the Ilisu Dam ‘may affect negatively the ongoing negotiation process between 
the Turkish government and the PKK’.142 The resistance of the PKK is used as another reason 
to shut down the Ilisu Dam project. In fact, the campaign of the NGOs loses legitimacy 
because of the militant resistance against the GAP. The Turkish authorities use the violence in 
the region to increase the militarization and securitization of the region and undermine the 
overall opposition against the GAP. This process will be discussed more thoroughly in the 
next chapter.   
  The actions and tools used by the NGO opposition can be described as soft power-
based. Its objectives are concrete but its use of normative, awareness creating mechanisms set 
it apart from the militant opposition. The PKK uses hard power tools, coercion and violence, 
but aims in this particular case to achieve similar objectives. This dichotomy between the 
main opposing forces undermines the power of the non-state actors, especially because the 
actions of the one are undermining the legitimacy of the other. Due to the extremist nature of 
the PKK actions and the governmental war on the party and its supporters it is unlikely and 
not advisable that the actors join forces and unite in their opposition against the GAP.  
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  The role of the international community and international funders, that was important 
during an earlier period, has largely disappeared. Because Turkey itself now largely finances 
the GAP, its dependency on approval of the international community has decreased. Although 
the momentum that the oppositional movement had during the first decade of the 21st century 
was lost, the resistance remained in place. The tools used by NGOs to challenge the hydro-
hegemony are largely normative of nature. Their campaign to provide transparency and 
spread awareness is aimed at creating normative pressure. Despite these soft-power tools and 
a lack of coercive mechanisms, such as military force or economic sanctions, the involved 
NGOs do try to enforce change by appealing to external partners, e.g. Bresser Eurasia or the 
European Court of Human Rights. The approach of the other main actor in challenging the 
hydro-hegemony is rather different. The tactics used by militant Kurdish groups in Turkey 
can easily be placed under the denominator of coercive mechanisms. The use of military force 
to obstruct the completion of certain GAP projects is a very direct attack against Turkey as 
hydro-hegemony but the PKK also makes use of more indirect attacks. The kidnapping of 
GAP personnel and the spread of anti-dam propaganda are threatening actions and create a 
feeling of unsafety surrounding the Turkish water development plans. Although the impact of 
their actions is substantial, it at the same time causes a backlash. The violent approach to 
resistance used by these militant groups alienates other opponents and undermines the 
legitimacy of the protest.   
Table 5. Impact of non-state resistance in Turkey 
Actor Action Impact 
NGOs and civil society - Advocacy campaigns for 
funders and involved parties  
- Demonstrations 
- Offer transparency  
- Legal measures 
- Unite local opposition and 
transnational opposition 
- Provide transparency about GAP 
development 
- Continue peaceful resistance 
- Legal process to stop the Ilisu 
Dam 
Kurdish militant groups - Attacks on construction sites 
- Kidnapping personnel  
- Anti-dam propaganda  
- Causing delay 
- Increasing costs 
- Fear amongst employees and 
resignation of employees 
-Alienation of other GAP 
opposition 
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  The opposing groups and actions analyzed in this chapter are, at least according to 
their view, reactions to actions of the Turkish government. The resistance of NGOs and civil 
society movements are a direct response to the GAP and Turkish water development plans but 
in the case of the militant Kurdish groups it is more difficult to conclude about what came 
first. Often the actions and reactions of supporters and opponents are intertwined. Whereas 
this chapter was solely focused on actions of the non-state resisting movement, the following 
chapter will analyze the (re)actions of Turkish authorities towards oppositional groups. This is 
not at all times a chronological continuation on this chapter but runs throughout, or parallel 
with the developments discussed above.    
 
Chapter 3- The hegemon strikes back  
A group that call themselves academics has emerged and spewed hatred against their state and 
nation by publicly taking sides with the terror organization [PKK]. My brothers, do you know 
who, which group, is the biggest enemy of these dams? It is the separatist terror organization 
and politicians and academics who support it.143   
        President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
 
The Southeastern Anatolia Project suffers from recurring physical and ideological attacks 
from opposition groups in and around Turkey. The Ilisu Dam remains the most controversial 
project of the GAP but other projects are targeted as well. The analysis above showed how 
and by whom the hydro-hegemony of Turkey is challenged. This however is not the end of 
this story. The Turkish state, hereby meaning the government and the GAP administration, is 
not passively watching these developments unfold. It has its own response mechanisms to 
these attacks and allegations. This chapter focuses specifically on the measures taken by the 
Turkish state in response to, or in order to counteract, the non-state resistance against the 
GAP. As mentioned above, the order of actions and reactions is not always clear. It partly 
depends on one’s political stance whether the actions of the government are seen as offensive 
or defensive. This chapter places the initiative with the Turkish government and the GAP 
administration and will explain how they have used the resistance of non-state actors to 
strengthen their belief in the need for a large-scale water development program and the 
implementation of GAP projects. Key to this analysis is the term ‘securitization’ and this 
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chapter will show how the Turkish government has connected the issues of water to 
(inter)national security. The securitization and militarization of the region will be discussed as 
well as the alteration of the demographic structure, the arrival and settlement of Syrians in 
Turkey and the impact of this development on the ethnic tensions and Kurdish opposition. 
The use of Syrian refugees for political benefits and ethnic rebalance in Turkey is a highly 
controversial topic. Although it is not the central aim of this analysis, it is interesting and 
necessary to include because the migration- and settlement policy of Turkey is by many 
opponents seen as interconnected with the ethnic instability of the Southeastern Anatolia 
region. The results of this chapter provide an insight into the responsive mechanisms of the 
hydro-hegemon and will help understand the overall power relations between the involved 
state and non-state actors in Turkish water politics. 
The securitization of water politics 
According to the hydro-hegemony framework securitization is one of the mechanisms used to 
influence relations by the hegemon of the river basin.144 A government can bring water issues 
into the realm of security and can thereby increase the importance of water development and 
management.145 Zeitoun and Warner state that: ‘Promoting a project to a national-security 
concern equates criticism to treason, thus silencing critical voices in the bureaucracy and 
maintaining a form of hegemonic thought control.’146 In reality this would mean that 
opposition to Turkish hydro-politics is seen as a subversion of national security. This, not 
surprisingly, could alienate people from the GAP opposition. A securitization policy can also 
be used to distract attention from other internal and external problems. The analysis below 
will look into the use and misuse of securitization policy by the Turkish government and will 
examine how, why and when issues of security and water are intertwined.  
International security  
At the initiation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project security was not a priority. The political 
climate of Turkey was not yet marked by conflicts based on ethnic diversity and inequalities 
amongst citizens. This however started to change quite rapidly after 1984 with the emergence 
of the PKK and activist attacks in Turkey. Gary Winslett has shown how security was a 
priority for Turkish and Syrian water policies. He concludes that in the period between 1980 
and 1998 the riparian relation between Turkey and Syria was strained because of the emphasis 
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on securitization by both parties.147 The issue of water sharing and management was 
continuously incorporated into talks about the political difficulties between the riparian states. 
Water resources were used by the Turkish state as a pressure tactic. The Turkish government 
threatened to cut off the water flow to Syria in order to enforce extradition of PKK leadership. 
This was only resolved by mediation of foreign partners and the surrender of Syria to Turkish 
demands.148 The power imbalance between the states was clearly used during this period by 
the hegemonic power but both parties resorted to a securitization discourse and the use of 
narrative based on terror, threat and instability.149  
  From 2000 onwards, after the reconciliation with the Syrian government and the 
stabilization of relations with Kurdish activist groups, the Turkish government was able to de-
securitize its water policy and show a bit more flexibility and generosity towards Syria 
concerning its water resources.150 Both states accepted new agreements that obliged Turkey to 
send 500 cubic meters of water an hour across the Turkey-Syrian border.151 Part of the 
success of this period and the agreements that were made can be explained by the separation 
of water issues from political and economic issues. The political stability made concentrated 
talks about sharing and caring for water resources possible without involving other criteria or 
conditions.152 In the past water had been used as part of a threatening rhetoric to enforce 
change or surrender. With the major political obstacles out of the way, Turkey and Syria were 
more willing to look towards mutual-benefit sharing and management of the water resources 
of the Euphrates and Tigris basin.153 It should come as no surprise that with the return of 
political instability, ethnic conflicts and international turmoil, the various actors involved in 
the water conflict wholeheartedly embraced the securitization discourse again. 
Domestic security   
A securitization campaign can often be used to legitimize actions that are exceptional and not 
condoned under normal circumstances.154 By placing measures under the heading of internal 
or external security, a government can silence any opposition to its policy. Due to the 
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perceived top-priority of security, criticism to the governmental policy can be equated to 
treason.155 In this particular case the involvement of security and control with water 
management and development by the Turkish government is a method to undermine existing 
opposition. The quote at the beginning of the chapter shows how such a security discourse is 
used. President Erdoğan equates support for the opposition to the construction of dams to 
‘hatred against their state and nation by publicly taking sides with the terror organization.’156 
The reason that such rhetoric can be successful is because it does have some legitimate 
argumentation behind it. Whenever the relations between the government and the PKK turns 
violent, dams and GAP construction sites get involved. Assaults on GAP projects increased 
after 2014 and the responses of the Turkish government and the GAP administration were 
fierce. Sadrettin Karahocagil, president of the GAP administration, responded to the troubling 
times in an interview in 2015. In his answers the dominance of a security discourse cannot be 
missed. He mentions several times that the terrorist assaults damage the implementation of the 
GAP projects and the development of the region at large. Karahocagil makes a clear 
distinction between Kurds in the region that benefit from the Southeastern Anatolia Project 
and that are in support of it and the terrorist groups that cause socio-economic damage to the 
people of the region.157  
Unfortunately, the restart of terrorist assaults aiming to disrupt peace and stability in the 
country has caused many fatalities and destruction started to be experienced again. […]I regret 
to say that GAP investments have also been disrupted to a considerable extent by the 
economic and social damage and the security gap caused by terrorist assaults in the region. 
The construction of some dams and hydroelectric plants as part of the project has come to a 
halt due to assaults and sabotage.158 
 
Official discourse  
This section will analyze the GAP action plans and programs over the last decades, in order to 
see if and how the official discourse of the Turkish government and the GAP administration 
was securitized.    
  At the start of the GAP program the goal of the project was to improve the economic 
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position of the Southeastern region and increase the energy supply of the Turkish state. The 
main objectives was the ‘rectification of inter-regional disparity in the Nation’s socio-
economic development.’159 Although the initial GAP Master Plan does mention the potential 
contribution to social stability, the language used is very technical and based on water 
development, agricultural progress and an increase of the export rate.160 There is no mention 
of terms such as peace, security or human development. It has already been mentioned in the 
first chapter that at the end of the 1990s the GAP administration made quite a drastic change 
to its overall objectives and the character of the project. This change in direction was 
paralleled by a change in the use of language. The new Action Plan that was created for the 
period 2002-2008 introduced new objectives. The GAP administration aimed ‘to enhance the 
level of welfare, peace and happiness of our citizens living in the region.’161 The critique that 
the GAP administration received in the 1990s about being undemocratic and unsustainable 
was incorporated in the new Action Plan. It talks about the involvement of local 
representatives of region’s provinces and the ‘participation of representatives from local 
governments, government agencies including central ministries, local professional 
organizations and non-governmental organizations as well as deputies from these 
provinces.’162 Involving new actors challenged the idea that the GAP lacked regional support.  
  In the newest Action Plan, that is set up for the period 2014-2018, the main objective 
of the GAP program is rephrased to ‘ensure peace and stability in the GAP region’.163 
Although the core of the program, social and economic development of the region and 
positive contribution to the national economy, is still in place, the objectives have become 
much broader and centered around sustainable human development. According to the new 
Action Plan: ‘Our aim is to make completed projects lasting, maintain peace by improving 
welfare and strengthen brotherhood.’164 Including a term such as brotherhood is unusual. It 
seems to indicate that the improvement of the relation between the Southeastern region, read 
the Kurds, and the rest of Turkey is part of the GAP program. It might be relevant to note that 
there is no single mention of the Kurds or the Kurdish presence in the region in this Action 
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Plan or any of the other official documents. The reference to brotherhood seems to be an 
implicit recognition of the struggles within the region.    
  With the analysis of the official GAP narrative throughout the last decades it can be 
concluded that there is a change in tone and language and that issues of security are 
increasingly incorporated into the official discourse. Although the mentions of stability and 
peace are still subtle, they do reveal the tendency to securitize the GAP program. The aim to 
strengthen the ‘brotherhood’ that is adopted in recent plans highlights the development that 
connects the GAP to internal stability and peace. Although it is not mentioned explicitly, this 
language connects to the political struggles within Turkey. 
Changing the demographic structure 
With a policy of securitization and militarization the Turkish government is able to increase 
its visible and ideological control over the GAP opposition. These are however not the only 
mechanisms used by the state authorities to undermine the resistance of non-state actors. The 
use of demographic alteration for political benefits is controversial but is included in this 
essay because the GAP does affect the demographic structure of the region, has made 
alterations to its programs because of the arrival of Syrians and because oppositional groups 
specifically mention demographic alteration as a tool of the GAP administration to undermine 
autonomy and human rights.165      
  There is no consensus about the demographic impact of the GAP on the Southeast 
region. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Ilisu Dam will result in the 
resettlement of 15.000 people, of various ethnic origins.166 Other sources mention numbers 
that rise up to 78.000, hereby excluding an extra 30.000 nomadic people, and emphasize the 
Kurdish majority.167 These are the estimated numbers of just one of the GAP dams. Corporate 
Watch conducted several interviews in late 2015 with residents in and around Hasankeyf. The 
interviews highlight the main concerns of the people that had to leave their homes: the lack of 
compensation, little job opportunities because of a decrease in tourism and the difficulties of 
protesting because of the presence of the military police.168 
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After the dam is completed we won’t have a home. I don’t know where we will go. We do not 
have the money for a new house in New Hasankeyf. We get very little money for the houses 
here. They have offered 60,000 lira but houses in New Hasankeyf are 120,000 lira.169 
     Asya Okay (Hasankeyf resident)  Interview 2015 
 
The demographic alteration does not only include the physical resettlement of people but also 
involves control over mobility and transportation. According to interviews conducted by 
Gilberto Conde, scholar on water politics and the impact of asymmetric power relations, 
leaders of Kurdish movements are convinced that the GAP is a tool to displace mass groups 
of Kurds from the region, hamper the mobility of people and divide the population.170  
According to the interviewed the disappeared villages are no longer able to hide militants 
because the GAP infrastructure has increased the visibility of fighters in the region. As a 
result of the constructed dams and hydropower infrastructure lakes have emerged in the 
region. These new lakes obstruct free movement in the region of militants but also of Kurdish 
citizens.171  
Syrian guests welcome  
When President Erdoğan in the summer of 2016 proposed to give the Syrians citizenship he 
received fierce opposition. The hashtag #UlkemdeSuriyeliIstemiyorum, translating to ‘I don’t 
want Syrians in my country’, became trending worldwide.172 Even migration experts were 
surprised by Erdoğan’s announcement. Many believed that his surprising promise was based 
on his desire to alter the outcomes of the referendum that would give him more constitutional 
power.173 Member of parliament Veli Agbaba responded by saying that: ‘The governing party 
clearly showed that they're not thinking about the future of these people, but rather their own 
political gain.’174  
  The International Crisis Group (ICG), an independent organization aimed at 
preventing war and conflict, published a report at the end of November 2016 about the 
presence and impact of Syrians in Turkey.175 The ICG concluded on the basis of interviews in 
the region that various minorities in the Southeastern region fear that the resettlement of 
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Syrians is used to alter the demographic balance and election-outcomes in favor of President 
Erdoğan.176 It is interesting to see that several population groups shared this sentiment. The 
Turkish Alevi’s, the Turkish Kurds and secularists all shared the concerns about the arrival 
and resettlement of Syrian newcomers in Southeastern Anatolia region.177 Although their 
specific concerns can differ, they all agree that the relocation of Syrians into the region can 
harm their, already limited, representation.  
Historical memories are evoked by the systematic relocation plans of the political leadership. 
There are many examples in our history of forced movements of political nature. In the ’50s 
and ’60s, Kurds were moved to the [western] provinces and tensions with residents erupted.178
      
        Ayhan Bilgen, HDP parliamentarian 
  
Kurdish activists have been very worried about the plans of the government. Because of a 
history of relocation concerning Kurds in Turkey, the situation is extra sensitive. The distrust 
in the region has resulted in an anti-refugee sentiment amongst certain parts of the 
populations. The violence against Syrians has increased in the southeastern region.179 The 
political consequences connected to the arrival of Syrians are overshadowing the 
humanitarian aspects of the crisis and so people who are generally in favor of a welcoming 
immigration-policy have changed their point of view.180  
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 Image 3. Settlement of registered Syrian refugees in the Southeastern region of Turkey   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“UNHCR Turkey: Syrian Refugee Camps and Provincial Breakdown of Syrian Refugees Registered in South East Turkey - 
May 2017,” UNCHR http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement.php?id=59&country=224&region=38 last accessed 06-
07-2017.  
 
 
Image 4. Percentage of total population  
“Turkey is taking care of refugees, but failing to integrate them,” The Economist, 29 June, 2017 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21724413-if-syrians-become-permanent-underclass-country-headed-trouble-
turkey-taking-care last accessed 07-07-2017.  
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 The provinces Gaziantep, Şanlıurfa, Adana, Mersin and Hatay house the largest group 
of registered Syrian refugees and refugee camps. It is very clear from the statistics that a large 
majority of the Syrian newcomers is residing in the Southeastern Anatolia region. Although 
Syrians are staying in every district in Turkey, the national imbalance is striking. The Turkish 
authorities do not openly communicate about the settlement of Syrians, their integration 
process or the demographic shifts and so it is unclear whether the resettlement of Syrians is 
part of a bigger governmental plan. Ersoy Dede, a journalist who writes for the pro-
government news outlet Star, wrote in response to the refugee debate that the permanent 
settlement of Syrians in the Southeast could be a solution to ethnicity-based conflicts and he 
claimed that the Turkish government had created a plan for demographic transition decades 
ago.181 This statement was however quickly denied by Dr Murat Erdogan, head of the Centre 
for Migration and Politics at the University of Hacettepe, who stated that the war in Syria and 
the successive refugee flow towards Turkey came as a complete surprise and that the Turkish 
government had no premeditated plan to alter the demographic composition of the country.182   
   It is debatable whether there was a premediated plan in place but it is fair to say that 
the magnitude and the longevity of the Syrian conflict and the refugee influx were not 
foreseen. Turkish authorities, much like European governments, believed that Assad and his 
regime would quickly be defeated and replaced.183 That is also why the Turkish state had 
from early on a welcoming open door policy towards Syrian ‘guests’. The term ‘guests’, 
which was and often is still used in Turkey, indicates that people believed that the presence of 
these Syrians would be temporary. When it became clear that there was no short-term solution 
to the conflict, the authorities had to come up with a policy aimed at integrating the 
newcomers.   
Alterations to the GAP 
In response to the arrival of the Syrian refugees the GAP administration made some 
alterations to its plans. The Action Plan 2014-2018 notes that the arrival of Syrian refugees 
has an impact on the Southeastern Anatolia region and has resulted in an ‘additional needs in 
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the GAP region in terms of food, nutrition, housing, health, education and infrastructure’.184 
In the official presentation of the GAP regional development administration of 2016 a special 
section is dedication to the impact of Syrians on the region and the projects under the header 
‘The activities carried out for Syrian guests’.185 The programs presented are set in the 
Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Hatay and Kilis provinces of the Southeast and aimed at strengthening 
social stability, empowerment of youth and women and improving work conditions and 
possibilities for Syrians and their host communities.186 All the projects that are presented are 
co-financed by international actors, e.g. the Japanese government, the European Union, 
government of Kuwait and UNICEF. The presentation does not explicitly mention ethnic 
tensions in the region but does express the will to ‘contribute to the strengthening of social 
stability in Southeastern Anatolia Region.’187 The GAP administration does not elaborate on 
the meaning of this regional social stability but it seems to refer to the political and military 
instability in the Southeast.   
  The arrival of millions of Syrians in Turkey and predominantly in the GAP region 
clearly had its effects. On the side of the opposition the open door policy of the Turkish 
government was received with suspicion. The fear of a demographic shift and a resulting 
decrease in representation caused animosity towards the Syrian refugees amongst the Turkish 
minorities. For the government and the GAP administration the arrival of the Syrians 
reinforced their belief in the necessity of the GAP program and the development of the 
Southeastern region. The rapid growth in population in the region increased the already 
existing needs but also increased the development potential, especially because the GAP was 
able to gain new financial support. It is not possible to conclude about the potential plans to 
use the Syrians to alter the demographic composition of the region but it is clear that the 
arrival of over 3 million Syrians will have a big impact on the sparsely populated Southeast 
region and that the Turkish authorities will try to utilize this situation to benefit their support 
base. 
  The Turkish state actors are not powerless in their response to GAP opposition. The 
unrest in the region, that is not only based on water development plans but is interconnected 
with water politics, is managed by an increasing physical and ideological presence. The 
resurrection of control posts, village guards and military personnel surrounding GAP projects 
																																								 																				
184 Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, “GAP Action Plan 2014-2018.”   
185 Southeastern Anatolia Project Regional Development Administration, “GAP Powerpoint,” 
http://www.gap.gov.tr/en/gap-general-presentation-page-31.html last accessed 13-04-2017.		
186	Ibid. 	
187 Ibid.  
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increases the visibility of the state. The securitization policy that is implemented is not only 
physical, in the sense that military force and threats occur, but also ideological. The narrative 
that links issues of water to security is propagated by the Turkish authorities and can be subtly 
found in the official Southeastern Anatolia Project discourse. Equating opponents of dams and 
hydropower plants to the support of terrorist organizations seems far-fetched but is a rather 
successful tool to undermine legitimacy of opponents. The recurring PKK attacks on dams 
and employees actually strengthens the message of the state authorities that the resistance is 
led by radicals and has no civilian support. Another mechanism that can potentially be used 
by the hegemonic actor to influence resistance is demographic alteration. The forced eviction 
of people from the region, the GAP infrastructure that divides and restricts mobility, and the 
reception of Syrians in the region all have the ability to undermine Kurdish presence and 
resistance in the Southeast. Although it is unclear whether the welcoming position towards 
refugees in Turkey is connected to ethnic rebalancing, the arrival of millions of Syrians to the 
Southeast region has the potential to make drastic changes to the region.  
 
Table 6. Response mechanisms of Turkish government 
Action Directed towards Impact 
Securitization  All non-state resistance - Undermine legitimacy of opponents  
- Link resistance with terrorism 
- Create support for militarization of 
the Southeast region 
Militarization  Kurdish militant groups  - Restrict violence against GAP 
projects and personnel  
- Increase physical and mental control 
over the region 
Demographic alteration 
 
Kurdish militant groups/civil 
unrest of the region 
- Potential long-term ethnic stability 
- Silence the voice of Kurdish 
opposition 
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Conclusion 
  The objective of this essay was to analyze to what extent non-state actors were able to 
challenge the hydro-hegemony of Turkey in the period 1980-2017. The case study on Turkey 
served as an example for regional water politics and the actors involved in water politics. 
With the hydro-hegemony framework at its basis, this essay wanted to add to current 
understanding of hydro-politics and the impact of power asymmetries between hegemonic and 
non-hegemonic actors.    
  Around 1980 Turkey established itself as the hydro-hegemon of the Euphrates-Tigris 
river basin. Its competitors, Iraq and Syria, were unable to enforce equal sharing treaties or 
control over the water resources of the region. Due to Turkey’s riparian position, its economic 
and military power, its material and immaterial infrastructure and its connections to the 
international community, the country was able to dominate regional water politics and 
cooperation. This hydro-hegemonic position was quickly put to use with the creation of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Project. This massive water development program was controversial 
from the start and sparked national and international opposition. Although the riparian states 
tried to challenge the hegemony of Turkey during this period, e.g. by addressing the 
international community and trying to come to treaties, they were unable to have a significant 
impact on the dominance of Turkey. It was therefore up to the non-state actors to challenge 
the hydro-hegemon. Their efforts were not without success. In the 1990s the international 
community was successful in encouraging the GAP to alter its objectives. As a response to the 
controversy surrounding the project, the administration decided to broaden the scope of the 
project and embrace, at least on paper, a program that included social and sustainable 
developments. For a while this switch seemed to satisfy the opposition but the controversy 
returned quickly hereafter. The new wave of protest was not solely based on the impact of the 
project on the water resources of Syria and Iraq but included environmental and cultural 
heritage concerns. The collaboration between international and national/local NGOs was 
partly successful. The objective of involved European NGOs, to halt European financial 
support for the projects, was reached but the broader objectives of local NGOs were not. The 
Turkish state was able to circumvent financial obstacles by using its own resources. Their 
dependency of foreign partners decreased whereas the freedom of the GAP administration 
increased.   
  The continuation of the Ilisu Dam construction after the perceived success of NGOs 
was a severe setback and it altered the activist momentum surrounding the GAP. Although 
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press- and academic coverage of the GAP controversy diminished, the opposition stayed in 
place and continued its resistance against the water development plans of Turkey. The NGOs 
and civil society movements, in a combined national, regional and international consortium, 
continued to resist the implementation of GAP projects. The opposition booked a few 
successes along the way but was unable to achieve drastic changes.   
  The other non-state actors that challenged the Turkish hydro-hegemony from 1980s 
onwards were Kurdish militant groups. The revival of violence between the PKK and the 
Turkish government in late 2014 was paralleled by attacks and threats aimed at the GAP and 
its dams. These groups had a lasting impact on the hegemony of Turkey. Their attacks caused 
great delay and thus high costs. For now the Turkish state is able to continue the 
implementation of its projects but it is possible that continuous attacks will result in shutting 
down construction work. In the past the tactics of the PKK temporarily halted the 
implementation of the Southeastern Anatolia Project. This ‘success’ however was not left 
unanswered. In the case of Turkey the hydro-hegemon responded to the hegemony 
challengers with securitization of water politics and militarization of the Southeast region. 
The government is also accused of using demographic alteration to silence opposition. With 
the arrival of millions of Syrians, most of them settling or being settled in the Southeast 
region, the Turkish government is even more convinced that a full development program of 
the region is a necessity. The fact that the arrival of refugees can provide an outcome for 
ethnic tensions could potentially drastically alter the position of the non-state opponents. With 
the mechanism of securitization the Turkish government equates opposition to water 
development plans to terrorism and national treason.   
  The discourse that is used by official authorities continuously connects resistance 
concerning water to radicalism and extremism. The limited tradition in Turkey of 
environmental activism is blocked by this development. This securitization is not only an 
ideological change, as in that the language that is used contains more terms connected to 
security and stability, but has a direct impact on the region and the response to GAP critics. 
The arrest of journalists and photographers covering the GAP is a sign that the hegemonic 
actor does not welcome opposing voices. The militarization of the region runs parallel to the 
securitization discourse. The presence of military posts, village guards and new infrastructure 
increases the visibility of state control over the Southeast region. The dams are by some 
opponents seen as a component of the military presence by the Turkish state and they see a 
connection to state preparations for large-scale conflict.   
  Measuring the impact of non-state actors on the hydro-hegemony of Turkey is 
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difficult, especially because the Turkish government refuses to acknowledge the extent and 
nature of the opposition. It is however clear that the Southeastern Anatolia Project has 
undergone several changes since its creation. The first major adaption of the project was in 
the 1990s when the GAP came to include broader, sustainable and social development 
objectives. This change happened under pressure from the international community, read 
European Community, but was encouraged by environmental NGOs and state actors from 
Syria and Iraq. The second peak of opposition was in 2000-2009 and in this period the NGO 
collaboration between Turkish and European organizations was successful in not only gaining 
substantial media coverage but also in discouraging European funders to finance the 
controversial project. This did have a severe impact on the GAP because Turkish authorities 
decided that the state would now finance a majority but it did not massively alter the proposed 
plans. The third and final peak of opposition started in 2012 and continues until now. Both 
violent and non-violent measures are taken to stop or change the construction of dams. The 
PKK is currently most successful in damaging the GAP projects and administration but its 
tactics are radical and rejected by other oppositional movements. 
Table 7. Process of non-state resistance against Turkish hydro-hegemony 
 Period 
Actor  1990s  2000-2009 2011-2017 
International 
community 
- Pressure to alter plans 
- Refuse funding 
- Research GAP and 
its consequences 
- Withdraw support 
- Legal measures 
NGOs and civil 
society 
- Raise concerns for 
social and environmental 
consequences 
- Address international 
community and funders  
- International 
campaigns 
- Legal measures 
- Address funders 
- Demonstrations 
- Awareness creation 
- Addressing funders 
and supporters 
- Legal measures 
Kurdish Militant 
Groups 
- Attacks on dams and 
hydropower plants  
- Ceasefire till 2004 
- 2004-2009 no 
specific campaign 
targeting GAP 
- Attacks on 
construction sites 
- Threats to involved 
personnel		
Impact GAP Loss of international 
support, conflict with 
riparian states, lack of 
investment 
Reputational damage, 
withdrawal of 
investments 
Delay and obstruction 
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Decisive actor International Community NGOs and civil 
society  
Kurdish militant groups 
Response GAP Alteration objectives of 
GAP 
Refuse foreign 
investment 
Securitization and 
militarization 
 
The decision of the Turkish government to refuse foreign investment in certain GAP projects 
became a key moment in the development of water politics in Turkey. Before this decision the 
dependency of the GAP on foreign money was extensive and consequently the vulnerability 
of the GAP was relatively high. The European funders involved were sensitive to 
environmental critique and allegations of human rights violations. These companies, 
especially the ones aligned with national governments, cannot afford reputational damage. 
With the withdrawal of European money in 2008/2009 the Turkish state and the GAP 
administration regained its freedom.  
 
Table 8. Power dimensions of state and non-state actors in hydro-politics (Turkish case)  
Actor  Power  Meaning Example 
Hydro-hegemonic 
actor 
Dimension 1 Material & immaterial 
capabilities  
Riparian location, international 
(financial) support, military 
strength 
Dimension 2 Agenda setting Favourable treaties for Turkey i.c.t. 
Iraq and Syria 
Dimension 3 Determining knowledge 
structure 
Convince the international 
community to accept Tigris and 
Euphrates as national instead of 
international waters 
Non-state actor Dimension 1 Material & immaterial 
capabilities  
Financial mobilization, military 
attacks  
Dimension 2 Agenda setting Trying to create legal framework to 
reject Ilisu Dam 
Dimension 3 Knowledge structure Damaging international reputation 
 
One of the aims of this essay was to add to the hydro-hegemony framework. In order to 
achieve such a framework alteration, the findings are schematized along the lines of non-state, 
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state and hegemonic actors. The table below shows a comparative analysis of hydro-political 
mechanisms of state and non-state actors.  
Table 9. Hydro-political mechanisms of state and non-state actors  
 Non-hegemonic state 
actors 
Hegemonic state actor Non-state actors  
Coercive - Military force 
- Covert action 
- Coercion/pressure 
- Military force 
- Covert Action 
- Coercion/pressure 
- Riparian position 
- Military force  
- Financial coercion 
- Coercion-pressure 
Utilitarian Incentives (economic and 
diplomatic)  
- Financial mobilization  
- International support 
- International (economic) 
incentives 
Normative Treaties - Treaties 
- Securitization 
- Knowledge construction 
- Sanctioned discourse 
- Exposing hegemonic 
knowledge construction 
- Alternative discourse   
- International law/accords  
  
  Looking at the success rate of non-state resistance throughout the decades, a few 
interesting points can be made. First of all, every non-state actor was relatively successful at 
one point. The international community and international funders were able to alter GAP 
plans and objectives in the 1990s, the (I)NGOs and civil society succeeded in convincing 
partners to withdraw in the beginning of the 21st century and the Kurdish militant movement 
is currently effective in obstructing and delaying the construction of proposed projects. 
Despite these successes the Turkish hydro-hegemon was able to circumvent these attacks. It 
broadened the objectives of the GAP to appeal to foreign partners, it used its own resources to 
finance the controversial projects and it adopted a policy of securitization and militarization to 
undermine the legitimacy of non-state opposition. The second conclusion is that the role of 
funding was and remains extremely important in the case of Turkey. To succeed in 
challenging a hydro-hegemon it is necessary to involve investors. Although Turkey for now is 
able to continue the GAP implementation, the risings costs make this increasingly difficult. 
Thirdly the lack of cooperation between non-state actors undermines the potential impact. The 
fact that the Kurdish militant groups fight their own fight against the dams and do not unite 
with NGOs and civil society weakens the power of the non-state actors. Collaboration 
between the two in this case is highly unlikely and not recommended because of the extremist 
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nature of the PKK, but in general collaboration between non-state actors that excel in different 
power dimensions multiplies the potential impact.   
  It was not the aim of this essay to encourage water-conflicts between state and non-
state actors. The analysis only shows how non-state actors can potentially balance power 
asymmetries between actors in water politics. The scarcity and importance of water resources 
in the region call for a cooperative effort between parties. If the hydro-hegemony of one party 
prevents such an effort, collaboration between non-state and non-hegemonic parties might 
offer the solution.  
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